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AN ANALYSIS OF ILLINOIS' NEW
OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER
TIMOTHY P. O'NEILL*

On July 1, 1987, Public Act 84-1450 will become effective.' This
law abolishes the offense of "voluntary manslaughter ' 2 and replaces
it with a system of degrees of murder. What used to be known as
"murder" is now "first degree murder;" 4 a new offense similar to
voluntary manslaughter is "second degree murder." 5 The sentencing
limits for murder apply to "first degree murder;" likewise the Class
One felony designation of voluntary manslaughter is retained for
"second degree murder."'7

The purpose of this article is to discuss why such a revision was
necessary. Such a discussion must first begin with the changes
wrought 25 years ago by the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961.'
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. A.B., Harvard
College; J.D., University of Michigan Law School.
1. This Act embodies Senate Bill 522, which was passed by the 84th General
Assembly, as well as certain technical changes contained in Governor James Thompson's amendatory veto.
2.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,

9-2 (1985).

3.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,

9-1 (1985).

4. The text of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 9-1 (1985) remains unchanged; the
name of the offense has been changed from "murder" to "first degree murder."
5. "Second degree murder" now occupies the section of the Code which used to
define "voluntary manslaughter." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 9-2.
6. As with murder, when a defendant is found guilty of first degree murder the
State may seek either a sentence of imprisonment or, where appropriate, a sentence
of death. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-5-3(c)(1). A sentence of death may be considered only when certain specified aggravating factors are present. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, T 9-1(b). Otherwise, the sentence for first degree murder is a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 nor more than 40 years, unless certain specified factors are
present which would justify either an extended term (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-82(a)(1)) or a sentence of natural life imprisonment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-81(a)(1).

7. Thus, the sentencing range for second degree murder will be identical to that
for voluntary manslaughter: not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years, unless
an extended term is applicable. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
1005-8-1(a)(4), 1005-82(a)(3).
8.

The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 became effective on January 1, 1962.
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THE CRIMINAL CODE OF

19619

Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961,0 Illinois
homicide law strongly reflected common law." Section 358 of the
previous Criminal Code had defined murder as "the unlawful killing
of a human being . . . with malice aforethought, either express or
implied.' 2 Manslaughter, on the other hand, was defined as "the

unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express or implied, and without any mixture of deliberation whatever.""3 Express
malice was defined as "the deliberate intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a fellow creature."" When no provocation appeared
or when the killing showed an abandoned or malignant heart, malice
was implied. 5 Thus, through 1961, Illinois courts treated malice
aforethought as a necessary element of murder."
At early common law it was helpful to consider malice aforethought as an element of murder because, at that time, the law recognized only one type of murder-the unlawful killing of another
with a premeditated intent to kill.' Malice aforethought succinctly
described this state of mind. Yet the concept of malice became confusing when the common law began to recognize new types of murder not requiring a premeditated intent to kill, while continuing to
ascribe malice aforethought to each new kind. For example, common
law judges began to characterize unintentional killings committed in
the course of a felony as murder." Similarly, an unintentional killing resulting from conduct evincing a "depraved heart" constituted
murder.' 9 An unintentional killing caused by a person who was acting with intent to do serious bodily injury was likewise found to be
9. This section is largely taken from an earlier work by this author. See O'Neill,
"With Malice Toward None": A Solution to an Illinois Homicide Quandary,32 DE
PAUL L.REv. 107, 109-110 (1982).
10. See supra note 8.
11. For a summary of the concept of murder at common law, see L. HALL & S.
GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 37-39 (2d ed. 1958).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 358 (1959) (emphasis added).
13. Id. 361 (emphasis added). Furthermore, to be classified as manslaughter the
killing had to be "voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation
apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible, or involuntary in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act without due caution or circumspection." Id.
14. Id. at 358. This intention had to be manifested by external circumstances
capable of proof. Id.
15. Id.
16. See People v. Bush, 414 Ill. 441, 111 N.E.2d 326 (1953); People v. Jones, 384
Ill. 407, 51 N.E.2d 543 (1943); People v. Pappas, 381 Ill. 90, 444 N.E.2d 896 (1942);
People v. Brown, 288 Ill. 489, 123 N.E. 515 (1919); People v. Curtright, 258 I1. 430,
101 N.E. 551 (1910).
17. W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, § 67, at 529 (3rd ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT].
18. Id.
19. Id.
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murder."
In all these situations, the actor lacked an express intent to kill.
Nevertheless, the courts referred to these killings as "murder with
malice aforethought." 2' Consequently, rather than requiring that
malice aforethought be established in every murder, the reverse became true: any act found to be murder was automatically endowed
with the characteristic of malice aforethought. What began as a descriptive phrase for a necessary element of murder was reduced to a
mere talisman.
HOMICIDE LAW UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE OF 196122

The drafters of the Criminal Code of 1961 recognized the obsolescence of malice aforethought. The Committee Comments acknowledged that "[t]he 'malice aforethought' concept has undergone
in Illinois the same reduction to actual intent, regardless of the time

available for deliberation, which it has undergone elsewhere."

The

Committee noted Illinois cases dating back to 1872 which had held
that the requirement of malice aforethought did not prevent an intentional killing, preceded by only a short period of deliberation,

from being considered murder.2 4
In response to the deterioration of malice aforethought, the
Committee eliminated any reference to it in the new Code. Instead,

murder was defined:
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
murder if, in performing the acts which cause death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual
or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual
or another; or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than volun20. Id.
21. The malice aforethought was found to be "implied", as distinguished from
intentional killings, where malice aforethought was "express". Id. For burden of proof
problems concerning implied malice, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
22. See note 9.
23. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979) Committee Comments-1961,
at 16-17 (revised 1972). See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 217 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (finding that killing was committed with malice has come to
mean simply that heat of passion was absent).
24. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979) Committee Comments-1961,
at 17 (revised 1972). The Committee, quoting Peri v. People, 65 Ill. 17, 18 (1872),
stated:
To constitute malice, it is not necessary that the party should brood over and
meditate upon the performance of the act for a considerable space of time; but
it is sufficient if it were deliberate and intentional, without apparently well
founded danger of great bodily harm, or where there is not such provocation as
in law reduces the homicide to manslaughter.
Id. at 23-24.
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tary manslaughter.2
In addition, voluntary manslaughter was no longer described
merely as a killing without malice aforethought, but rather:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter'if at the time of the killing he is acting
under a sudden and intense passion .... "
(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes
the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would
justify or
27
exonerate the killing ... but his belief is unreasonable.
It is important to observe the symmetry between these new definitions of murder and voluntary manslaughter. Putting aside felony
murder,2 8 the statute prescribed that a murder was committed when
a person acted intentionally or knowingly.29 These two states of
mind mirror precisely those required under unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter.8 0 Provocation manslaughter, on the other
hand, mentions no mental state. 1 Where a statute does not prescribe a mental state, proof of intent, knowledge, or recklessness
generally is sufficient.82 Recklessly performed acts which cause
death, however, come under the purview of involuntary manslaughter. 2 Therefore, murder and voluntary manslaughter require identi25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1 (1985).
26. Id. at 9-2(a).
27. Id. at 9-2(b). This unreasonable-use-of-force voluntary manslaughter was
not recognized prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961. See People v.
Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546, 554-55, 413 N.E.2d 378, 383 (1980).
28. Under the felony murder rule, a person is guilty of murder if he kills an
individual during the attempt or commission of a forcible felony other than voluntary
manslaughter. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1(a)(3) (1981). For a thorough discussion of
the felony murder rule. See R. PERKINS & R. BoYcE, CRIMINAL LAW 75 (3d ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as PERKINS & BOYCE]. This Article's analysis is inapplicable to felony murder.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1 (1981). Under the Code, a person intents to accomplish a certain result if "his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that
result or engage in that conduct". Id. at 4-4. A person acts with knowledge of the
nature or attendant consequences of his conduct when he is "consciously aware that
his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist". Id. at 4-5(a). Knowledge of a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that such
fact exists. Id. "A person acts with knowledge of the result of his conduct when he is
consciously aware that such result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct".
Id. at 4-5(b).
30. Compare id. at 9-1(a)(1), (2) with id. at 9-2(b).
31. See id. at 9-2(a).
32. Id. at 4-3(b). This rule does not apply to offenses which involve absolute
liability. Id.
33. Illinois defines involuntary manslaughter as an unintentional killing where
the acts which cause the death are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some
individual, and those acts are performed recklessly. Id. at 9-3. A person acts recklessly when he "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow ... and such failure constitutes a substantial deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise
in the situation". Id. at 4-6.
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Cal mental states-intent or knowledge-as well
as an identical re34
sult: the unjustified killing of a human being.
The significance of this symmetry lies in the fact that, prior to
the 1961 Code, requiring proof of malice aforethought presumed
that murder contained a discrete mental element not present in
manslaughter.3 5 This relation may be expressed in the following
syllogism:
1. If the elements of murder are proven, then, a fortiori, malice exists.
2. Malice is not present in manslaughter.
3. Therefore, a finding that murder has been proven precludes a finding of manslaughter.
Consequently, voluntary manslaughter could have been described as
"murder minus malice aforethought."
The elimination of malice aforethought from the old law, however, greatly simplified the murder/voluntary manslaughter dichotomy. Under the prior law, a finding of murder foreclosed the possibility of manslaughter. Implicit in a finding of murder was a finding
of malice aforethought, and therefore the homicide could not have
been manslaughter. Under the new Criminal Code, on the other
hand, voluntary manslaughter could be proved only if all the elements of murder were proved. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter
involved an unjustified homicide performed intentionally or knowingly. Unlike murder, voluntary manslaughter contained mitigating
circumstances. With the elimination of malice aforethought, voluntary manslaughter became "murder plus mitigating circumstances."
Consequently, murder and voluntary manslaughter were no longer
inherently different crimes. Instead, they were different degrees of
the same crime - an unjustified killing performed intentionally or
knowingly."
34. It must be emphasized that the felony murder theory is not subject to this
analysis. Even accidental homicides may constitute murder under this theory. The
only requisite intent is the defendant's intent to commit the underlying felony. See
People v. Jeffrey, 94 Ill. App. 3d 455, 460, 418 N.E.2d 880, 885-86 (5th Dist. 1981);
People v. Miner, 46 Il. App. 3d 273, 282, 360 N.E.2d 1141, 1148 (5th Dist. 1977).
35. See, e.g., People v. Pappas,381 Ill. 90, 44 N.E.2d 896 (1942) (element that
distinguishes murder from manslaughter is malice); People v. Lewis, 375 Ill. 330, 31
N.E.2D 795 (1940) (same), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 628 (1941).
36. Professor Perkins, a staunch supporter of the use of malice aforethought,
contends that it is a useful concept if properly understood. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra
note 11, at 73-75. He defines its as "an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated
person-endangering-state-of-mind." Id. at 75. But note the two discrete mental elements running through this allegedly unified state of mind. First, it concerns what
the defendant wishes to do to the victim; that is, perform a "person-endangering" act.
Second, it concerns why he is acting in such a manner; that is, it is concerned with
the possibility of justification, excuse, or mitigation. These are two very different concerns. Malice aforethought is thus a particularly clumsy element to include in murder
because it forces the state to prove not only the effects intended by the actor vis-a-vis
the victim (the "what" prong), but also to prove that the acts were unlawful, unjustifiable, inexcusable, and accompanied by no mitigating circumstances (the "why"
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EFFECTS OF THE CHANGES IN THE NEW CODE

This radical change of the definition of "voluntary manslaughter" from "murder minus malice aforethought" to "murder plus
mitigating circumstances" had several collateral effects.
1. The "Lesser Included Offense" Issue And Its Effect On Jury
Deliberations.
Under the new definition, voluntary manslaughter was no
longer a lesser included offense of murder.
Illinois defines an "included offense" as one that is established
by "proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable
mental state (or both).""7 Voluntary manslaughter could not be an
"included offense" under the first part of the test because it required more elements than murder, i.e., it was composed of all the
elements of murder in addition to "sudden and intense passion" or
an "unreasonable belief in self-defense."
Nor did voluntary manslaughter have a "less culpable mental
state." Illinois recognizes only four mental states: intent, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence.38 Murder and voluntary manslaughter
each require the same mental state-either intent or knowledge.89
Thus, voluntary manslaughter was not an "included offense" of
murder. 0 More properly, it was a less culpable kind of murder-"murder with mitigating circumstances."
This would have a significant effect on jury deliberations. Under
the old law, a jury considering both murder and voluntary manslaughter would first consider the murder verdict. If they found the
prong). Perkins's contention that the prosecution is aided by the presumption that

every homicide has been committed with malice aforethought only makes the concept
seem even more irrelevant. Id. at 77.
The Illinois Criminal Code simplified homicide by defining unlawful killings as
murder when accompanied by a specific state of mind vis-a-vis the victim. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, 9-1 (1981). Section 9-2 then set forth those mitigating circumstances
which would reduce those unlawful killings to voluntary manslaughter. The finder of
fact need not have considered these mitigating circumstances unless there was some
evidence introduced at trial which, if believed, would have reduced the crime to voluntary manslaughter. People v. Lockett, 82 11. 2d 546, 550, 413 N.E.2d 378, 381
(1980).
37.
38.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 2-9 (1985).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, pars. 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 (1985).

39. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
40. Despite this, Illinois courts continued to refer to voluntary manslaughter as
an "included offense" of murder. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court insisted
that voluntary manslaughter had a "less culpable" mental state than murder. People
v. Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d 186, 194, 478 N.E.2d 335, 340 (1985). The court failed to confront the fact that Illinois by statute recognizes only four mental states (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, pars. 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7 (1985)); apparently, the court wished to create a
new mental state sua sponte.
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defendant guilty of murder, it was unnecessary to consider the manslaughter verdict; since murder included malice, manslaughter was
not a possibility. If they found the defendant "not guilty" of murder, they would then have to decide whether manslaughter, the
lesser included offense, had been established.
The new definitions reversed this procedure. Now a "not guilty"
on murder precluded any further inquiry; if the elements of murder
had not been established, then voluntary manslaughter could not
exist. Similarly, a finding of "guilty" of murder was merely the beginning of the voluntary manslaughter inquiry, for voluntary manslaughter was simply "murder plus mitigating circumstances." Thus,
a "not guilty" verdict of murder a fortiori meant "not guilty" of voluntary manslaughter, while a "guilty" verdict of voluntary manslaughter by definition included a finding of "guilty" of murder.
2.

The State of Mind Needed For Voluntary Manslaughter

Some confusion existed in the old law as to precisely what state
of mind was needed for manslaughter. The issue was whether the
"sudden heat of passion" rendered the act something less than intentional. 4 1 As noted, this was clarified in the new definition. Illinois
only recognized four possible states of mind in the entire Criminal
Code;42 two of those-intentional and knowing-applied to volun3
tary manslaughter.4
3.

Burden of Proof

The Code failed to deal with a significant problem in the new
scheme. If voluntary manslaughter was now merely "murder plus
mitigating circumstances," which side should bear the burden of
proving those circumstances and what standard of proof should be
applied?
The problem manifested itself in two ways." Consider a defendant on trial for murder. The State's case is totally directed towards
convicting the defendant of that crime. The defendant's case, on the
other hand, presents unimpeachable evidence that he acted with an
41. Compare Moore v. People, 146 Ill. 600, 35 N.E. 166 (1893) (suggests that the
crime of manslaughter does not include an intent to kill) with Hammond v. People,
199 Ill. 173, 180, 64 N.E. 980, 982 (1902) (sudden passion of manslaughter did not
mean that actor lacked intent to kill, but merely mitigated the gravity of the crime).
See O'Neill, supra note 9, at 115-18.
42. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
43. Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. The following hypotheticals are taken from an earlier work by this author.
See O'Neill, "MurderLast Foul": A Proposalto Abolish Voluntary Manslaughterin

Illinois, 72 ILL. B.J. 306, 307 (1984).
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unreasonable belief in self-defense, thus reducing the murder to voluntary manslaughter. Because there is evidence in the record which,
it believed by a jury, would reduce the crime to voluntary manslaughter the jury is instructed on that theory."' If the mitigating
circumstance of "unreasonable belief" is considered one of the elements of the offense of voluntary manslaughter, then the jury will be
told that the State must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.4 However, in our scenario the State has not proven, nor does it intend to
prove, any such thing. All of the State's evidence is geared toward a
murder conviction. The jury is thus compelled to find the defendant
guilty of murder.
Now consider the situation in which the state charges a defendant with voluntary manslaughter. Assume the State needs to prove
two elements beyond a reasonable doubt. First, it must show that
defendant is a murderer, i.e., one who intentionally or knowingly
killed a human being with no justification. Second, it must show
some type of mitigation sufficient to reduce the crime to voluntary
manslaughter. Assume the State has no difficulty proving the accused is a murderer. Now assume that its evidence of mitigation is
far short of being proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant
cannot be convicted of murder because that is greater than the
crime charged; 47 and, since the State failed to prove the mitigation
beyond a reasonable doubt, there must be a not guilty verdict on the
voluntary manslaughter charge. The murderer then goes free. Thus,
problems remained to be solved.
THE IMPACT OF THE NEW DEFINITION OF VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER ON ILLINOIS COURTS

Illinois courts took little notice of the major new Criminal Code
revisions in the area of homicide. Over twenty years after the Code
eliminated the concept of "malice aforethought," Illinois courts con4
tinued to explain that malice was a necessary element of murder. '
Twenty-one years after the adoption of the Code, neither the Illinois
Appellate Court nor the Supreme Court could explain precisely why
it was wrong for a trial judge to tell a jury "if you find [defendant]
45.

People v. Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546 (1980).

46. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
47. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948).
48. People v. Barney, 111 I1l. App. 3d 669, 676, 444 N.E.2d 518, 523 (1st Dist.
1982). Numerous other cases contain the same legal error. See, e.g., People v. Evans,
92 Ill.
App. 3d 874, 979, 416 N.E.2d 377, 380 (2d Dist. 1981); People v. Cowen, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 437, 441, 386 N.E.2d 435, 438-39 (1st Dist. 1979); People v. Tiller, 61 Ill.
App.
3d 785, 794, 378 N.E.2d 282, 290 (5th Dist. 1978); People v. McCord, 46 Ill. App. 3d
389, 392, 361 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1st Dist. 1977); People v. Walden, 43 Ill. App. 3d 744,
752, 357 N.E.2d 232, 239 (1st Dist. 1976); People v. Muldrow, 30 Ill.
App. 3d 209, 217,
332 N.E.2d 664, 669 (1st Dist. 1975).
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guilty of murder, then you do not consider voluntary manslaughter. 4 9 Twenty-three years after the adoption of the Code, the Illinois Appellate Court failed to understand that an acquittal on murder barred a second prosecution for voluntary manslaughter on
double jeopardy grounds.50 Twenty-four years after the adoption of
the Code, the Illinois Supreme Court continued to refer to voluntary
manslaughter as a "lesser included offense" of murder."' Judges
(and lawyers) clung to their old common law idea of manslaughter
and refused to look at the obvious changes made by the Illinois
Criminal Code.
Likewise, the courts failed to understand that voluntary manslaughter required either an intentional or knowing state of mind
accompanied by sudden passion or unreasonable belief of self-defense. Instead, ignoring the Code's insistence that only four culpable
mental states exist in Illinois criminal law, the Illinois Supreme
Court in 1985 insisted that voluntary manslaughter included a
unique state of mind shared by no other offense in the entire Criminal Code. 2
The only defense that can be offered on the courts' behalf is
their failure to receive assistance from the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions. The First Edition of the instructions issued in 196811 included radically different forms for "provocation" voluntary manslaughter and "unreasonable belief' voluntary manslaughter.
Nothing in the instructions indicates that the Committee understood the revisions made by the new Criminal Code. As to "provocation" voluntary manslaughter, the Committee assigned the State the
burden of proving provocation beyond a reasonable doubt, 4 thus
49. People v. Pastorino, 90 I1. App. 3d 921, 925, 414 N.E.2d 54, 58 (1st Dist.
1980), rev'd, 91 Ill.
2d 178, 188, 435 N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (1982).
50. People v. Krogul, 115 11. App. 3d 734, 450 N.E.2d 20 (2nd Dist. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
51. People v. Hoffer, 106 Il1.2d 186, 478 N.E.2d 335 (1985).
52. Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d at 194, 478 N.E.2d at 340. ("This mental state [of voluntary manslaughter] is considered less culpable [than murder]"). Yet less than a year
later the Supreme Court, without any reference to Hoffer, said "The definition of
voluntary manslaughter in our criminal code does not contain language distinguishing
it from murder in regard to the defendant's intention or mental state." People v.
Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 18, 28, 488 N.E.2d 973, 978 (1986).
53. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions -Criminal (1st ed. 1968).
54. 7.06 Issues in Voluntary Manslaughter - Intentional - Belief of Justification.
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter the State must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the defendant intentionally or knowingly performed the acts

which caused the death of _; and
Second: That when the defendant did so he believed that circumstances
existed which would have justified killing _; and

Third: That the defendant's belief that such circumstances existed was

unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:209

creating the problems discussed earlier. Perversely, the Committee
assigned a totally different burden in "unreasonable belief" cases.
There, the instruction told the jury that they could only convict of
murder if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not believe he was justified in using force.55 Conversely,
the jury was told that they could only convict of voluntary manslaughter if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did have such a belief.56 (Presumably - and unbelievably
- defendant was somehow guilty of neither offense if the jury believed neither proposition beyond a reasonable doubt.)
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find
the defendant guilty.
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you should find the defendant not guilty.
I11.Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal No. 7.06 (1st ed. 1968).
55.
7.02 and 25.05
To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of
John Smith;
Second: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or do great
bodily harm to John Smith, or
he knew that his act would cause death or great bodily harm to John
Smith, or
he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to John Smith, and
Third: That the defendant was not justified in using the force which he
used; and
Fourth: That the defendant did not believe that circumstances existed
which justified the use of the force which he used.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find
the defendant guilty of murder.
If, on the other hand, you find from you consideration of all the evidence
that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you should find the defendant not guilty of murder.
Ill. Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal No. 27.01 (1st ed. 1968).
56.
7.06
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter the State must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the defendant intentionally or knowingly performed the acts
which caused the death of John Smith; and
Second: That when the defendant did so he believed that circumstances existed which would have justified killing John Smith; and
Third: That the defendant's belief that such circumstances existed was
unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the
defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence
that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you should find the defendant not guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Ill. Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal No. 27.01 (1st ed. 1968).
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The Second Edition of the instructions issued in 1981 made further changes. The burden of proof on provocation manslaughter remained the same; once again, the State had to prove it beyond a
reasonable doubt.5 7 Changes occurred in the "murder/unreasonable
belief manslaughter" area, however. Now, where that type of manslaughter was an issue, the State could prove murder without disproving the fact that the defendant may have had a subjective belief
in the necessity of force." As to unreasonable belief manslaughter,
the State still had to prove that fact - defendant's subjective belief
of justification - beyond a reasonable doubt."
57. To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove
the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of _;
and
Second: That when the defendant did so, [1] he intended to kill or do great
bodily harm to _; or [2] he knew that such acts would cause death or great
bodily harm to -; or [3] he knew that such acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to _; and
Third: That when the defendant did so, [1] he acted under a sudden and
intense passion resulting from serious provocation by another; or [2] he acted
under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by some
other person he endeavored to kill, but he negligently or accidentally killed _.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find
the defendant not guilty.
Ill. Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal No. 7.04 (2d ed. 1981). The first two elements constituted the offense of murder.
58. To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of _;
and
Second: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to _; or he knew that his acts would cause death or great bodily harm
to _; or he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to _; or
Third: That the defendant was not justified in using the force which he used.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find
the defendant not guilty.
Ill. Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal 7.02 & 24-25.06A (2d ed. 1981).
59. To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the State must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of _;
and
Second: That when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or do great
bodily harm to _; or he knew that his acts would cause death or great bodily
harm to _; or he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm to _; and
Third: That when the defendant did so he believed that circumstances
existed which would have justified killing; and
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The effect of the Second Edition instructions was this: in any
case where a jury considered both murder and voluntary manslaughter, a verdict of "guilty" on voluntary manslaughter a fortiori meant
the defendant was also "guilty" of murder. Thus, under the Second
Edition instructions, a jury returning "guilty" verdicts on both murder and voluntary manslaughter had rendered consistent findings,
and judgment should have been entered on the voluntary manslaughter charge because it was "murder plus mitigating circumstances." Not surprisingly, juries began returning such verdicts in
real cases.60 The courts-apparently without reading the instructions-patronizingly concluded that juries did not understand the
issues and found them to be inconsistent verdicts." In People v.
Almo, the trial judge refused to accept a jury's guilty verdicts on
both murder and voluntary manslaughter based upon unreasonable
belief of self defense. The judge held they were inconsistent verdicts,
even though the most cursory look at the instructions would show
that they were entirely consistent: the jury found "murder plus mitigating circumstances" and thus found defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter. The trial court forced the jury to deliberate further,
and they then found defendant guilty of murder. Both the Illinois
Appellate Court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed; neither court
apparently bothered to read the instructions. 2
A

PROPOSED SOLUTION

In response to these difficulties with the voluntary manslaughter statute, this author in February, 198463 proposed the following
changes in the law:
1. The name "voluntary manslaughter" should be abolished; instead,
the offense should be called "second degree murder" in order to emFourth: That the defendant's belief that such circumstances existed was
unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of
these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find

the defendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of
these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant not guilty.
Ill. Pattern Jury Instructions - Criminal No. 7.06 (2d ed. 1981).
60. People v. Washington, 127 Ill. App. 3d 365, 468 N.E.2d 1285 (1984); People
v. Milner, 123 Ill. App. 3d 656, 463 N.E.2d 148 (1984); People v. Kendricks, 121 Ill.
App. 3d 442, 459 N.E.2d 1137 (1984); People v. Fox, 114 Ill. App. 3d 593, 449 N.E.2d
261 (1983).

61. See, e.g., People v. Washington, supra, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 375, n.2, noting
the "distinction, indeed the contradiction, between murder and voluntary
manslaughter."

62.

People v. Almo, 123 Ill. App. 3d 406, 462 N.E.2d 835, aff'd, 108 Ill. 2d 54,

483 N.E.2d 203 (1985).

63. See supra note 44.
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phasize its proper role as "murder plus mitigating circumstances."
What the Code calls "murder" should be re-named "first degree
murder."
2. Neither side should have the burden of proving the mitigation in
the offense, i.e., the sudden and intense passion or the unreasonable
belief in self-defense. Instead, the jury should simply be told that as
long as the mitigation rises to a specified level of proof, they should
return a verdict of second-degree murder, assuming the elements of
first degree murder are found to exist.
3. Preponderance of the evidence should be the quantum of proof
needed to establish the existence of the mitigating circumstances.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has no place in such a reckoning; by
the time the jury is considering mitigating circumstances they have
already found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. If mitigation exists by a preponderance of the evidence, defendant should be guilty of only second degree murder.
The drafter of the bill which became Public Act 84-1450, Judge
Robert Steigmann, 6' 4 considered these recommendations and
adopted most of them. The new law changes the offense to second
degree murder and specifies that mitigation must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence.6 5 In place of the "free-floating" burden of proof, however, the new law unfortunately places the burden
6
of establishing the mitigating evidence on the defendant.'
EFFECTS OF THE NEW LEGISLATION

1.

The Constitutionality of the Provision

The United States Constitution provides that no person may be
convicted of any offense unless each element of guilt is established
beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 Moreover, the Illinois Criminal Code
establishes that "[n]o person shall be convicted of any offense unless
his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'s6 Despite this, it is
clearly constitutional to require the defendant to produce sufficient
evidence of mitigation to reduce a charge of murder for first degree
to second degree.
The new Illinois scheme is strikingly similar to that found constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Pattersonv. New
York.6" Patterson dealt with a state statute defining murder as intentionally causing the death of another person. It also provided
that a person otherwise guilty of murder could reduce her offense to
manslaughter if she proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
64.
65.
66.
67.

Judge of the Circuit Court, 6th Judicial Circuit, Urbana, Illinois.
Public Act 84-1450 at 4213.
Id.
Winship, supra n.46.
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 3-1 (1985).
69. See supra, note 23.
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she had acted under extreme emotional disturbance. The Court
found such a scheme proper, because establishing the extreme emotional disturbance "[did] not serve to negative any facts of the crime
which the State [had] to prove in order to convict of murder."
Likewise, under the new Illinois scheme a person who either intentionally or knowingly kills someone without justification is guilty
of first degree murder. Establishing the mitigating circumstances of
second degree - either sudden passion or unreasonable belief of
self-defense - does not change the fact that the person is still a
murderer; it merely results in a less severe punishment. Thus, the
mitigating circumstances do not establish "guilt" as defined in the
Illinois Code; they merely prove that defendant is less culpable than
other murderers. Therefore, placing this burden on the defense is
70
constitutional.

Yet there is a problem with placing the burden on the defendant which has nothing to do with constitutional principles. Consider
a situation in which the prosecution's case-in-chief includes testimony that the defendant acted under sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation. The defense decides to rest without presenting any evidence and requests that the jury be instructed
on second degree murder. In this situation, the jury must be carefully instructed that the failure of the defense to offer any evidence
does not preclude the jury from finding that the defense has met its
burden of showing mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Essentially, the jury's function is to make a Solomon-like decision
whether any mitigating evidence exists anywhere in the record
which militates in favor of leniency, i.e., a finding of second degree
murder. Which side produced the mitigating evidence is utterly irrelevant. As this author has previously argued, allocating this burden to a specific party only obfuscates what is essentially an act of
71
mercy on the part of the fact-finder.
70. The principles supporting this type of analysis were again endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court last term in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 S. Ct. 2411,
(1986) (state may properly treat possession of a firearm during commission of an offense as a sentencing consideration to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than an element to be power beyond a reasonable doubt, even though proof of
such a fact entitles defendant to a mandatory five year sentence), and again this term
in Martin v. Ohio, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (1987) (no violation of due process for state to place
burden of proving self-defense on defendant under Ohio's "aggravated murder"
statute).
71. See O'Neill, supra n.44, p. 307. Fortunately, Judge Steigmann, the bill's author has unequivocally stated that the statute places no burden of presenting evidence upon the defendant. See Steigmann, First and Second Degree Murder in Illinois, 75 ILL. BAR J. 494 (May 1987).
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2. Eliminating the Problem of the Rendition of Guilty Verdicts
for Both Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter
Changing the names of "murder" and "voluntary manslaughter" to "first degree murder" and "second degree murder" should
eliminate the aforementioned problem of juries returning guilty verdicts on both crimes. What is needed is a revision of the Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions which emphasizes the relation between
the two offenses and is structured so that the jury understands that
it should return a guilty verdict on either first or second degree
murder, but not both. Examples of such instructions are included in
the Appendix to this article.
3.

The Offense of "Attempt Second Degree Murder"

Voluntary manslaughter was the unjustified, intentional or
knowing killing of a human being, with the actor either possessing
an unreasonable belief in self-defense or being in a state of sudden
and intense passion resulting from serious provocation.72 Let us assume, however, that under the prior definitions an actor 1) intended
to kill another person and 2) had either an unreasonable belief in
self-defense or acted with sudden and intense passion. If the victim
died, obviously the defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
But what if the victim lived? In that case, the defendant acted with
intent to kill but failed. Therefore, he was guilty of "attempt murder." However, the mitigating circumstances of voluntary manslaughter were present. He was thus guilty of "attempt murder plus
mitigating circumstances." Since "murder plus mitigating circumstances" constituted the offense of "voluntary manslaughter", it was
clear that "attempt murder plus mitigating circumstances" constituted the offense of "attempt voluntary manslaughter."
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, obstinately refused to recognize the crime of "attempt voluntary manslaughter." 3 The effect
of this perversity was that if an actor killed a person under voluntary manslaughter circumstances, he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter - a Class One Felony. But if an actor failed in his attempt to kill under voluntary manslaughter circumstances, he was
guilty of attempt murder, a Class X felony. The new names of the
offenses will eliminate this anomaly and clarify the fact that a person can be guilty of either "attempt first degree murder" or "attempt second degree murder."
72.
73.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 9-2 (1985) repealed by Public Act 84-1450.
People v. Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d 238, 457 N.E.2d 1258 (1983).
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4. Double Jeopardy Effects of A Conviction of Second Degree
Murder
Just as voluntary manslaughter was not a lesser included offense of murder, so too is second degree murder not a lesser included offense of first degree murder. A lesser included offense has
either fewer elements or a less culpable mental state."4 Second degree murder does not have fewer elements the first degree murder;
indeed, it embodies all of first degree murder plus mitigating circumstances. Nor does second degree murder technically have a less
culpable mental state; like first degree, it requires an intentional or
knowing state of mind.
This presents some procedural difficulties. Consider a defendant
charged with armed robbery; he is convicted of simple robbery. If
the robbery conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial, the
defendant can be retried only for robbery; the Double Jeopardy
Clause forbids retrial on armed robbery because he has already been
acquitted of the "armed" element. The general rule is that conviction on a lesser-included offense operates as an acquittal on the
greater charge."
The situation is different in second degree murder. When a jury
convicts on second degree murder, rather than first degree murder,
it has not found that the elements of first degree murder are missing. Rather, it has found all the elements of first degree murder as
well as mitigating circumstances. There has been no showing that
the elements of first degree murder have not been proven.
What should happen, then, where a conviction for second degree murder is reversed .on procedural grounds and a new trial is
ordered? Since the jury found defendant guilty of "first degree murder plus mitigating circumstances," should defendant have to stand
trial for first degree murder again?
Clearly, fundamental fairness demands that since the defendant
has already "run the gantlet"7 6 of the first degree murder charge at
the first trial - and was instead convicted of second degree - that
he should not have to face the charge of first degree murder. The
Double Jeopardy Clause could enter the picture if we instructed the
jury at the first trial that, if they find defendant guilty of second
degree murder, they should explicitly acquit defendant of first degree murder. The problem with entering a judgment of acquittal is
that it is not entirely accurate; again, the verdict of second degree
74.
75.
76.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 2-9 (1985).
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
Id. at 190.
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murder explicitly includes all the elements of first degree murder."
There is a way to trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause without
resorting to a formal acquittal. The instant problem is analogous to
the situation which faced the United States Supreme Court in Bull8
ington v. Missouri.7
The defendant in Bullington was convicted of
capital murder. Following a hearing, the jury sentenced him to life
imprisonment rather than death. On appeal, he was granted a new
trial on procedural grounds. The Court ruled that Missouri was
barred from again seeking the death penalty at retrial. For purposes
of double jeopardy, the Court found several reasons why the Missouri sentencing proceeding was comparable to a trial. First, the discretion of the jury was confined to only two options: death or life
imprisonment without possibility of release for 50 years.70 Second,
the jury's decision was guided by substantive standards and was
based on a procedure which resembled a trial.80 Third, the prosecutor had to prove certain statutorily defined facts beyond a reasonable doubt before death could be imposed."1
The instant situation is similar to Missouri's scheme. Like Missouri, the fact-finder in our statute has carefully limited options:
first degree murder, second degree murder, or neither. Like Missouri, the fact-finder's decision is fettered by specific guidelines in
making that decision; moreover, in our situation the evidence is actually presented at trial. Unlike Missouri's system, the burden is on
the defendant, rather than the State, to prove the statutory factors.
Yet this appears to be a distinction without a difference.
Thus, Bullington probably supports the idea that once a defendant has been convicted of second degree murder, the Double
Jeopardy Clause forbids her from ever again being tried for first degree murder. Nevertheless, a trial judge can eliminate future
problems by simply entering a judgment of acquittal on first degree
murder whenever there is a judgment of guilty on second degree
murder.
5. Retrial on the Charge of Second-Degree Murder.
Assume that for procedural reasons a conviction on second degree murder is reversed and remanded for a new trial. How the retrial is conducted depends on which type of second degree murder is
77. Thus, the situation is different from that in Green, where the conviction on

second degree murder was found to be inconsistent with, and an implied acquittal of,
first degree murder. See Green, at 203, n. 2-3.
78. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).

79. Id. at 438.
80. Id.
81. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:209

at issue.
First, consider where the first trial was concerned with second
degree murder based on an unreasonable belief of self-defense. The
jury at the first trial had three options: 1) they could have found
that the killing was unjustified and that the defendant was guilty of
first degree murder; 2) they could have found that the killing was
justified because the defendant acted with a reasonable belief that
deadly force was necessary, and thus the defendant was not guilty of
any crime; or 3) they could have found that defendant had a subjective, albeit unreasonable, belief in the need for deadly force and that
he was guilty of second degree murder. Assume the jury convicted
on second degree murder and the Appellate Court reverses on a procedural matter and remands for a new trial. As demonstrated above,
a retrial on first degree murder should be barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.8" Therefore, at the retrial the only issue is whether
defendant is guilty of second degree murder or nothing. That is, the
jury at the retrial should be instructed that they must assume defendant in fact had a subjective belief that deadly force was necessary; if they find that belief reasonable, they must acquit; if they
find that belief unreasonable, they must convict on second degree
murder.
A different situation presents itself if the original trial was concerned with second degree murder based upon the provocation theory. The jury at the first trial had three choices: 1) they could have
found that defendant committed an unjustified killing and was
guilty of first degree murder; 2) they could have found that defendant did not commit an unjustified murder and was therefore not
guilty of any crime; or.3) they could have found that the defendant
committed an unjustified murder but performed the act in a state of
sudden passion caused by a reasonable provocation, and was thus
guilty of second degree murder. Assume the jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder and the Appellate Court reverses
on a procedural matter and remands for a new trial. Again, retrial
on first degree murder is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.8"
At a retrial, the defendant could seek an acquittal by challenging
whether he actually killed the victim or whether he had the proper
mens rea. But, in reality, when second degree murder based on
provocation is an issue, a verdict on that charge is usually a victory
for the defendant. The typical scenario is that the State charges the
defendant with first degree murder; at trial, the defendant does not
deny the murder, but rather agrees that it was performed under
provocation; the jury is then instructed on both first and second de82. See notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
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gree murder. Thus, the defendant will have actually conceded the
elements of first degree murder, and is merely asking the jury to
find sufficient mitigation to reduce it to second degree. A second degree murder conviction is the best possible outcome for the defendant. If a retrial is then ordered for procedural reasons, the defendant
actually has two options. First, he can choose to plead to the second
degree charge and eliminate a retrial on that issue; that, after all, is
what he may have desired in the first place. Second, if he demands
retrial, the only issues open to the jury are whether the defendant
caused the killing and whether he had the proper mens rea - in
other words, the issues involved in first degree murder. If the jury
finds that either of these elements has not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, they should acquit the defendant. If the jury at
retrial finds the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable
doubt, double jeopardy precludes the entry of such a verdict;84 since
the fact-finder at the first trial found the defendant proved provocation by a preponderance of the evidence, the judge at the second
trial must then enter a judgment of second degree murder.
6. When Second Degree Murder Can be Considered as an Alternative in a First Degree Murder Case
The issue of when a fact-finder at a first degree murder trial
may consider second degree murder as an alternative presents several problems. The manner in which Illinois has treated this issue in
the murder/voluntary manslaughter context provides guidance for
dealing with this issue under the new first degree murder/second degree murder scheme.
A. When Defendant is Tried For First Degree Murder Before a
Jury
1. If The Defendant Requests A Second Degree Murder
Instruction
If there was evidence in the record which, if believed by a jury,
would reduce the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter, then a
voluntary manslaughter instructions tendered by the defendant had
to be given.85 Conversely, a voluntary manslaughter instruction tendered by the defendant could not be given to the jury where the
evidence clearly demonstrated that the defendant was guilty of ei84. Id.
85. People v. Simpson, 74 I1. 2d 497, 384 N.E.2d 373 (1978); People v. Handley,
51 Ill. 2d 229, 235, 282 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1972); People v. Joyner, 50 Ill. 2d 302, 306,
278 N.E.2d 756 (1972).
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ther murder or nothing." If, however, such mitigating evidence existed, a trial court had a duty to even correct faulty voluntary man87
slaughter instructions which might be tendered by the defendant.
At the same time the failure of a defendant to request and
tender a voluntary manslaughter instruction resulted in the waiver
of any claim on appeal that such an instruction should have been
given to the jury."
These rules are directly applicable to first and second degree
murder.
2. If the Defendant Fails to Request a Second Degree Murder
Instruction
If the evidence in a murder case raised the issue of voluntary
manslaughter, and the defendant did not request such an instruction, the decision whether to so instruct the jury was committed to
the discretion of the trial judge. 8 ' At least one appellate court decision held that the failure of a trial judge to sua sponte instruct the
jury on voluntary manslaughter could never be considered reversible
error.' 0
What might possibly constitute an abuse of the judge's discretion in this area was unclear. In People v. Lockett,"1 the Illinois Supreme Court held that whenever a self-defense instruction was tendered in a murder case, the trial court also had to tender an
"unreasonable belief" voluntary manslaughter instruction. This was
necessary because a jury always had two options if it found that a
defendant had a subjective belief in self-defense: if the belief was
reasonable, the defendant was not guilty of any crime, but if the
belief was unreasonable, the defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter.' 2 Thus, in such a case, a trial judge apparently had to
tender an "unreasonable belief" voluntary manslaughter instruction
even over the defendant's objection.' 8 In People v. Lewis, however,
the First District Appellate Court rejected defendant's contentions
that 1) the trial judge had a sua sponte duty to tender a voluntary
manslaughter instruction in a Lockett situation" and 2) that, at the
86. People v. Simpson, supra n.85; People v. Craven, 54 Ill. 2d 419, 282 N.E.2d
131 (1973).
87. People v. Joyner, supra n.85.
88. People v. Taylor, 36 Ill. 2d 483, 224 N.E.2d 266 (1967).
89. Id.
90. People v. White, 8 Ill. App. 3d 416, 291 N.E.2d 46 (1972).
91. 82 Ill. 2d 546, 413 N.E.2d 378 (1980).
92. Id. at 552.
93. See People v. Falkner, 131 Ill. App. 3d 706, 475 N.E.2d 964 (2d Dist. 1985).

94. 97 Ill. App. 3d 982, 423 N.E.2d 1157 (1st Dist. 1981).
95. Id. at 987-88.
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very least, the record should indicate that the court had actually
exercised its discretion in reaching that decision." Justice Rizzi, in
dissent, argued that an exercise of discretion should not be assumed
97
on a silent record.

The passage of the new act provides Illinois courts with an opportunity to eliminate confusion in this area of the law. The new act
specifically provides that, in a first degree murder prosecution, a second degree murder instruction should be tendered to the jury only if
requested by the defendant.971 Lockett should be interpreted to
mean that whenever self-defense is an issue, an instruction on second degree murder based on an unreasonable belief in self-defense
should always be tendered to the jury, unless the defense explicitly
objects to the procedure. It is only logical that, if the jury finds defendant had a subjective belief of the need for self-defense, they
should be told that they must tender different verdicts based on the
reasonableness of that subjective belief. Yet, if a defendant wishes
to preclude a jury from a "compromise" verdict of second degree
murder, the defendant should be able to restrict the jury's options
to "first degree murder or nothing". That type of trial strategy
should remain the prerogative of the defense.
There is no reason why the Illinois Pattern Instructions should
not adopt this as a black letter rule: whenever a jury is instructed on
self-defense in a first degree murder case, they should also be instructed on "unreasonable belief" second degree murder, unless the
defendant objects.9s The "automatic" nature of this rule argues in
favor of allowing a defendant on appeal to raise a judge's failure to
observe it as plain error.
A different rule should be used, however, when a defendant fails
to tender a "provocation" second degree murder instruction. Although nothing should preclude the judge from suggesting this option, she should have absolutely no duty to comb the second for evidence of "sudden passion". Clearly, the new act places the burden of
requesting such an instruction on the defendant. The new act allows
a defendant to gamble on a "first degree murder or nothing" verdict.
Thus, the new act provides that a defendant can always prevent a
second degree murder instruction from being tendered to the jury."
96.
97.
97.1
98.

Id. at 988-89.
Id. at 993-97.
Public Act 84-1450.
The converse of this rule is equally true: if a defendant raises the issue of

"unreasonable belief" second degree murder, then the trial court should automati-

cally instruct the jury on self-defense as well. It would be difficult to conceive of a
situation in which defense strategy would argue against instructing a jury on selfdefense.
99. Such a rule would also eliminate a problem with sufficiency of the evidence
such as that manifested in People v. Fausz, 95 Ill. 2d 535, 449 N.E.2d 78 (1983). See
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When Defendant is Tried For First Degree Murder At a
Bench Trial

A defendant being tried for murder at a bench trial had absolutely no right to restrict the trial judge from considering the possibility of a finding of voluntary manslaughter.' 00
Even though the new Act states that a first degree murder defendant should have an absolute right to prevent a jury from considering second degree murder, it is silent regarding a bench trial.
Judge Steigmann argues that the defendant at a bench trial should
have a similar right. Symmetry would appear to support this, although in reality it might appear foolhardy for a defendant to attempt to prevent a judge from finding that the murder was accompanied by mitigating circumstances.
7. Challenging the Sufficiency of the Evidence of a Second Degree
Murder Conviction
Several problems arise in the area of a defendant-appellant asking an appellate court to reverse a second degree murder conviction
based on insufficiency of the evidence.
If a defendant-appellant is challenging a second degree murder
conviction which is based on unreasonable belief of self-defense, she
has two possible tacks. First, she can argue that a reversal is mandated because one of the elements of first degree murder is not present, that is, that the State failed to prove that the defendant actually performed an unjustified killing either knowingly or
intentionally. 01 In the alternative, she can argue that even though
she performed the requisite acts, her belief in the need for deadly
force was reasonable, rather than unreasonable; thus, rather than
being guilty of second degree murder, she is guilty of no crime. 02
If a defendant-appellant is challenging a second degree murder
conviction based upon provocation, the options of challenging on insufficiency of the evidence are more limited. As in "unreasonable belief" second degree murder, a defendant can assert that one of the
elements of first degree murder is not present and that the second
degree conviction must be reversed outright. 0 3 A different situation
presents itself if a defendant has been found guilty of the first degree murder elements beyond a reasonable doubt, but is merely
infra n. 105.
100. People v. Taylor, supra n.88; People v. Binion, 132 Ill. App. 2d 257, 267
N.E.2d 715 (2d Dist. 1971) (dictum).
101. See P.A. 84-1450 at 4206.
102. See P.A. 84-1450 at 4213.
103. See P.A. 84-1450 at 4214.
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challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of sudden passion and
provocation. The mischief here is obvious. If the defendant-appellant convinces the court that the existence of the sudden passion or
provocation has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence, then the defendant is arguably not guilty of second degree
murder, but is rather guilty of first degree murder. However, the
Appellate Court is barred from entering a judgment of first degree
murder because defendant was acquitted of this charge at trial and a
judgment of first degree murder would violate double jeopardy principles.10 4 Thus, according to this scenario, a defendant clearly guilty
of first degree murder goes free.
Illinois courts foolishly allowed this type of mischief in the mur05
der/voluntary manslaughter area. In People v. Fausz,1
the Illinois
Supreme Court reviewed a voluntary manslaughter conviction and
found no evidence of either provocation or unreasonable belief in
self-defense.'" It thus reversed the voluntary manslaughter conviction; because Fausz had been explicitly acquittal of murder at trial,
07
he was found not guilty of any criminal homicide.1
Fausz was incorrectly decided. Obviously, a defendant cannot
be guilty of a criminal offense unless the State proves each element
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 08 Fausz's error was defining the
mitigating circumstances of "sudden passion/provocation" as an "element" of voluntary manslaughter. Understanding why "sudden
passion/provocation" is not an "element" of second degree murder
will a fortiori explain why it was also not an element of voluntary
manslaughter.The Illinois Criminal Code provides that "[n]o person
shall be convicted of any offense unless his guilt thereof is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."'"9 Whether sentenced under first degree or second degree, the convicted defendant is nonetheless guilty
of murder. The "sudden passion" factor of second degree murder
does not establish guilt; it is not an "element" which establishes culpability; on the contrary, it merely shows that that particularmurderer is less culpable than other murderers. A person convicted of
second degree murder has simply been "given a break". Thus, under
the principles of Patterson v. New York,"" the "sudden passion/
provocation" factor in second degree murder is not an "element" of
that offense.
104. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; ILL. CONST. art. I, sec. 10 (1970).
105. 95 Il.2d 535, 449 N.E.2d 78 (1983).

106. Id. at 539-40.
107. Id. at 541. No court at any level in the Fausz case recognized that verdicts
of "not guilty" if murder and "guilty" of voluntary manslaughter were legally inconsistent verdicts. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 3-1 (1985).
109. Id.
110. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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This fact has a serious effect on a defendant's ability to appeal
a second degree murder conviction based upon insufficiency of the
evidence of "sudden passion/provocation". Such a defendant-appellant is not denying that he is a murderer; rather, he is perversely
complaining that the fact-finder showed leniency by only finding
him guilty of second degree, rather than first degree murder. Such
an appellant is alleging no prejudice; if a defendant cannot show he
was prejudiced, he simply has no issue to raise on appeal. This is
because Supreme Court Rule 615(a)111 establishes that "[any error,
defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded" on appeal."' An Appellate Court simply
has no power to find that a "substantial right" of a murderer was
violated when he was convicted of a lesser, rather than a greater,
degree of murder. Thus, the Appellate Court lacks jurisdiction over
such a claim.
Allowing a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of mitigating
evidence would violate other interests as well. Double jeopardy concerns aside, one reason why the State cannot appeal an acquittal on
grounds that the defendant should have been found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt is that the jury simply has the right to ignore all
instructions and acquit the defendant in an exercise of leniency. 1 8
Likewise, a jury might find that a murderer should be punished
under second degree, rather than first degree, for reasons totally unrelated to the instructions tendered to them. A convicted murderer
should obviously not be able to exploit this exercise of leniency into
an acquittal on all charges of criminal homicide.
Thus, under either Rule 615(a) or on jury leniency principles, a
defendant should not be allowed to appeal a "provocation" second
degree murder conviction on grounds of insufficiency of evidence of
provocation. If a defendant is convicted of "provocation" second degree murder, the Appellate Court should affirm as long as it finds
that the State has established the elements of first degree murder
beyond a reasonable doubt.
8.

Hattery Problems in the First Degree/Second Degree Murder
Case

In People v. Hattery,11' the Illinois Supreme Court faced a situation in which defense counsel at a capital murder trial used the
strategy of conceding his client's guilt at the trial and then arguing
for leniency during the death sentencing hearing. In reversing the
111.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, par. 615(a) (1985).

112. Id.
113. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984).
114. 109 Ill. 2d 449, 488 N.E.2d 513 (1985).

19861

Second Degree Murder

conviction, the Court held:
"Counsel may not concede his client's guilt . . . where a plea of
not guilty has been entered, unless the record adequately shows that
defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to his counsel's
strategy."" 8
Hattery arguably has relevance to the new murder degrees statute. Consider a defendant charged with first-degree murder. He
pleads "not guilty" and goes to trial. His defense consists of admitting the killing, but arguing that it was the result of sudden passion
from a reasonable provocation and that he is only guilty of second
degree murder. Note that trial counsel, similar to Hattery, will actually be conceding guilt on the elements of first degree murder; he
will merely be arguing that the provocation should reduce it to second degree murder.
On the other hand, one could argue that Hattery has no applicability; counsel, after all, is not suggesting that the jury should return a verdict on first degree murder. Yet, despite the "not guilty"
plea, counsel is conceding that all the elements of that offense are
present beyond a reasonable doubt. To avoid appellate embarrassment, trial counsel may wish to make a pretrial showing on the record that the defendant is knowingly and intelligently consenting to
this strategy.
CONCLUSION

Illinois' former murder/voluntary manslaughter dichotomy was
replete with serious conceptual difficulties. The new first degree/second degree statutory scheme has the potential to cure most of the
old problems. This will be accomplished only if all participants in
the criminal justice system are willing to replace obsolete jury instructions and outmoded common law concepts with new instructions and ideas consistent with our revised statute.

115. 109 Ill. 2d at 465.
116. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Subsection (c) of Section 9-2 (Second Degree Murder) is set
forth as follows:
(c) When a defendant is on trial for first degree murder and evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of
this Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder. However, the burden of proof remains on the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder
and, when appropriately raised, the absence of circumstances at the
time of the killing that would justify or exonerate the killing under
the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code. In a jury trial for first
degree murder in which evidence of either of the mitigating factors
defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented and the
defendant has requested that the jury be given the option of finding
the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the jury must be instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his
burden of proof with regard to second degree murder until and unless
it has first determined that the State has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt each of the elements of first degree murder.
The proposed instructions are as follows:
PROPOSED IPI-CRIMINAL 2.01.
The defendant is charged with the offense of First Degree Murder. The defendant has pleaded not guilty to that charge. You are to
decide based upon the evidence in this case whether to return a not
guilty verdict, a verdict of guilty of First Degree Murder, or a verdict
of guilty of Second Degree Murder.
PROPOSED IPI-CRIMINAL 7.05A
A mitigating circumstance exists so as to reduce the offense of
first degree murder to the lesser offense of second degree murder if at
the time of the killing the defendant believes that circumstances exist
which would justify the deadly force he uses, but his belief that such
circumstances exist is unreasonable.
PROPOSED IPI-CRIMINAL 7.02, 7.06 AND 24-25.06A
COMBINED
To sustain the charge of first degree murder, the State must
prove each of the following propositions:
First: That the defendant performed the acts which caused the
death of John Smith; and
Second: That when the defendant did so, he either -
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(1) intended to kill or do great bodily harm to John Smith;
or
(2) knew that his act would cause death or great bodily
harm to John Smith; or
(3) knew that his acts created a strong probability of death
or great bodily harm to John Smith; and
Third: That the defendant was not justified in using the force
which he used.
If you find from your consideration of all the defendant has
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should
find the defendant not guilty [of first degree murder] and your deliberations [on this charge] should end.
(Note: Use of the brackets in the above paragraph depends upon
whether first degree murder is the only charge or whether there
are other charges for the jury to consider.)

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each
one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you should go on with your deliberations to decide whether a
mitigating factor has been proved so that the defendant is guilty of
the lesser offense of second degree murder instead of first degree
murder.
You may not consider whether the defendant is guilty of the
lesser offense of second degree murder instead of first degree murder
until and unless you have first determined that the State has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the propositions of first degree
murder.
The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that a mitigating factor is present so that he is guilty of
the lesser offense of second degree murder instead of first degree murder. By this I mean that you must be persuaded, considering all the
evidence in the case, that it is more probably true than not true that
the following mitigation is present: that the defendant, at the time he
performed the acts which caused the death of John Smith, believed
the circumstances to be such that they justified the deadly force he
used, but his belief that such circumstances existed was unreasonable.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is
guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder instead of first
degree murder, you should find the defendant guilty of second degree
murder.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
defendant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he
is guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder instead of first
degree murder, you should find the defendant guilty of first degree
murder.
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PROPOSED IPI-CRIMINAL 26.01
The defendant is charged with the offense of first degree murder.
If you find that the State has proved the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of first degree murder, you must then
decide whether the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder
instead of first degree murder. Accordingly, you will be provided with
three verdict forms: "Not Guilty", "Guilty of first degree murder",
and "Guilty of second degree murder."
From these three verdict forms, you should select the one verdict
form that reflects your verdict and sign it as I have stated. You should
not write on the other two verdict forms at all. Only one of these three
verdict forms is to be signed by you.

